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(L. A. No. 24090. In Bank. NOT. 5, 1957.J 
ALICE F. ROZAN, Respondent, v. MAXWELL M. ROZAN, 
Appellant. 
[1] Con1liet of Laws-Personal Property.-Marital interests in 
movables acquired during coverture are governed by the law 
of the domicile at the time of their acquisition. 
[2] IeL-Personal Property.-The interests of spouses in movables 
do not change though the movables are taken into another 
state or are used to purchase land in another state. 
[3] Divorce-Evidence-Residence.-A finding in a divorce action 
that the spouses established their residence in the state not 
later than July of 1948 was sustained by evidence that they 
resided in another state until May of that year; by the wife's 
testimony that, after learning she was pregnant, they decided 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws, § 40 et seq.; Am.Jur .. Con-
flict of Laws, § 65 et seq. 
[3] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 66; Am.Jur., 
Divorce and Separation, § 248. 
McB:. Dig. References: [1,2] Conflict of Laws, § 18; [3] Divorce, 
§ 101; [4, 5, 9, 10] Husband and Wife, § 200 j [6] Husband and 
Wife, § 48 j [7] Husband and Wife, § 69 j [8] Divorce, § 234(2) ; 
[11] Courts, § 26; [12] Equity, § 7; [13] Judgments, § 474; [14,15] 
Divorce, § 132. 
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that she should go to the husband's sistcr-in-law's place in Los 
Angeles, which she did, that later in July he came to Los 
Angeles, and that they took up their residence in Canoga Park 
where they lived from August until December of the follow-
ing year, at which time they rented a furnished house at San 
Gabriel, later bought the house and thereafter lived there; 
and by the husband's testimony that he "moved out here 
[California] when [the wife] came out here to give birth to 
our son" and that he had voted in this state "By absentee 
ballot at the last presidential election [1952]" and had con-
sidered this his residence since 1948. 
[4] Husband and Wife - Actions - Evidence.-A finding in a 
divorce action that, after the spouses became domiciled in 
this state and as a result of the husband's work and skills as 
an oil broker and operator they acquired some money and 
property, but that they thereafter lost everything so acquired 
by them and he was obliged to apply to the Veterans' Adminis-
tration for a pension in order to furnish them their necessary 
living expenses and necessities of life, was substantiated by 
the wife's testimony as well as that of the husband, who stated 
"At that time I was hard pressed. I had properties but no 
income." 
[5] Id.-Actions-Evidence.-A finding in a divorce action that 
properties acquired out of the state were purchased with mov-
ables was sustained by the husband's testimony that he made 
a lot of money on Canadian ventures as an oil operator and 
that it was with this money that the properties were pur-
chased. 
[6] Id.-Community or Separate Property - Property Acquired 
Out of State.-Purchase money for properties acquired out of 
the state by efforts and skill of a husband as an oil operator 
subsequent to establishment of a California domicile is com-
munity property. 
[7] Id.-Determination of Character of Property.-In the absence 
of evidence of gift, bequest, devise or descent, it is presumed 
that all property acquired by a husband after marriage is 
community property. (Civ. Code, §§ 163, 164.) 
[8] Divorce - Disposition of Community Property - Extreme 
Cruelty.-Where a divorce is granted on the ground of extreme 
cruelty, it is within the court's discretion to assign the com-
munity property to the respective parties in such proportions 
as it deems just. (Civ. Code. § 146.) 
[9] Husband and Wife-Actions-Evidence.-A finding in a wife's 
divorce action that the hushand's purported transfers of COIll-
munity realty to ~is nephew took place on or about the dates 
of recordation, not on the dates in the deeds, was supported 
by evidence that many of the dates on the notarized deeds 
) 
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were dates that other evidence showed could not possibly be 
the dates on which the deeds were notarized. 
[10] Id.-Actions-Evidence.~Findings in a divorce action that 
purported transfers of community realty by the husband to 
third persons were fraudulent as to the wife and were not 
bona fide were sustained by evidence that one transferee did 
not own the lease he was giving in trade for the realty, that 
the same realty was later transferred to defendant's nephew 
and the first transferee accepted as payment the nephew's un· 
secured note for some $49,000, that much of the land was 
transferred to the nephew as trostee of a purported trust for 
which there was no consideration, and that the wife did not 
consent to the transfers. 
[11] Courts---Jurisdiction-Scope.-A court of one state cannot 
directly affect or determine the title to land in another. 
[12] Equity-Jurisdiction-Extra.territorial Action.-A court, with 
the parties before it, can compel the execution of a conveyance 
in the form required by the law of the situs, and such con· 
veyance will be recognized there. 
[13] Judgments-Foreign Judgments-Full Faith and Credit.-A 
decree of a court of equity should be given the same full faith 
and credit as is accorded any other kind of judgment. 
[14] Divorce-J'udgment-.B.es Judicata.-A judgment in a divorce 
action affecting a division of community realty in another 
state is res judicata and entitled to full faith and credit in 
the other state to the extent that it determines the rights and 
equities of the parties with respect to such realty, but must 
be modified to the extent it purports to affect the title to the 
land. 
[15] Id.-Judgment.-A divorce judgment was not binding on de-
fendant's nephew, who held the record title to community 
realty, nor on a minor child, who was the beneficiary of a pur-
ported trost, where they were not parties to the action. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of LoR 
Angeles County. Harold C. Shepherd, Judge.- Modified and ~ 
affirmed. 
Action for divorce. Judgment for plaintiff modified and 
affirmed. 
Maxwell M. Rozan, in pro. per., for Appellant. 
Gustave L. Goldstein for Respondent. 
------------------~'. -------------------------------
[11] See Cal.Jur.2d, Courts, §§ 78, 79; Am.Jur., Courts, § 240. 
• A8signed by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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TRA YNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action against her 
husband, Maxwell M. Rozan, for divorce, support, custody of 
their minor child, and division of their community property. 
Certain other persons involved in transactions with Rozan 
were named defendants. Appearances were made on behalf 
of defendants Rozan, Lee McCormick, and Bernard Siegel. 
Edward Rosen and M. W. Truss appeared pro se. 
The trial court granted plaintiff an interlocutory judgment 
of divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty, awarded her 
the custody of the minor child, ordered defendant to pay $75 
per month for child support, $250 per month for plaintiff's 
support, and $12,500 for attorney's fees. The court adjudged 
that the parties became domiciled in California in May 1948 
and in any event not later than July 1948 and that the 
property thereafter acquired was community property and 
awarded plaintiff 65 per cent thereof. Defendant appeals. 
Although defendant "does not challenge the lower Court 
for granting the divorce" and "is content to have the divorce 
granted to Respondent, so as to terminate the instant mar-
riage" he contends that there was not sufficient evidence that 
he was guilty of cruelty to justify awarding plaintiff more 
than 50 per cent of the property, that certain oil properties 
outside of California adjudged to be community property 
were his separate property, and that the court erred in finding 
that there was no consideration for defendant's transfer of 
certain property, that certain transfers were made to defeat 
plaintiff's interest therein, that the parties became domiciled 
in California and in awarding plaintiff attorney's fees, ali-
mony, and child support. 
The reporter's transcript of 886 pages contains conflicting 
evidence with respect to all matters questioned by defendant, 
and it cannot reasonably be doubted that it contains sub-
stantial evidence in support of the findings and judgment. 
No useful purpose would be served in recounting the many 
incidents that support the court's finding of extreme cruelty. 
The amounts awarded for attorney's fees, alimony, and child 
support were not unreasonable under the facts as found by 
the trial court. Since defendant is primarily concerned with 
the division of property, we shall review briefly the evidence 
that supports that division. 
The first finding eSSential to the division of the property 
is that plaintiff and defendant "established their residence 
and domicile in California in May, 1948, and in any event 
not later than July, 1948" and "that ever since they have 
) 
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been and still are residents of and domiciled in the State of 
California." [1] A determination of the domicile is essen-
tial, for marital interests in movables acquired during cover-
ture are governed by the law of the domicile at the time of 
their acquisition. (Schecter v. Superior Court, ante, pp. 
3, 10-11 [314 P.2d 10]; Estate of Bruggemeyer, 115 Cal. 
App. 525, 538 [2 P.2d 534] ; Jl!stis v. Atchison, T. &: S. F. Ry. 
Co., 12 Cal.App. 639, 644 [108 P. 328] ; Civ. Code, § 164; see 
Rest., Conflict of Laws, § 290; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 
[2d ed.] p. 313; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3d ed.) p. 385.) 
[2] Moreover, the interests of the spouses in movables do 
not change even though the movables are taken into another 
state or are used to purchase land in another state. (Tomaier 
v. Tomaier, 23 Ca1.2d 754, 759 [146 P.2d 905] ; Depas v. Mayo, 
11 Mo. 314, 319 [49 Am.Dec. 88] ; see also Beard's Ex'r v. 
Basye, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 133, 146; Avery v. Avery, 12 Tex. 
54 [62 Am.Dec. 513] ; Rest., Conflict of Laws, §§ 290, 291; 
Stumberg, Conflict of Laws [2d ed.] p. 314; Goodrich, Con-
flict of Laws [3d ed.] p. 378.) 
Defendant contends that there is no evidence that he was 
ever in California before July of 1948 and that sending his 
pregnant wife to California to make a home there in May of 
1948 did not establish his domicile in California. (See Shee-
han v. Scott, 145 Cal. 684, 690 (79 P. 350]; 17 Pitts.L.Rev. 
97.) It is unnecessary to determine whether defendant was 
domiciled in this state prior to July 1948, for all the property 
involved was acquired subsequent to that date. 
[3] The record shows that plaintiff and defendant resided 
in Glenwood Springs, Colorado, until May 19, 1948. Plaintiff , 
testified that in January of that year they learned that plain-
tiff was pregnant. They had a letter from defendant '8 sister-
in-law inviting plaintiff and defendant to live with h'er and 
stating that she would take care of plaintiff and give her a i 
good home until defendant made a fresh start in life. Plain- ' 
tiff and defendant agreed that they would make their home 
wherever plaintiff wished and they decided that she should 
go to defendant's sister-in-Iaw's place in Los Angeles. She 
left for Los Angeles and that day or the next, defendant left 
for Canada. In July 1948 defendant came to Los Angeles, 
and he and plaintiff went house-hunting and took up their 
residence in Canoga,Park, where they lived from August 1948 
until December 1949. Defendant lived there when he was 
in town until December 1949, when they rented a furnished 
house at San Gabriel with an option to buy. They bought the 
Nov. 1957] ROZAN V. ROZAN 
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house and thereafter lived there. Defendant was interested 
in oil lands and traveled extensively. In a deposition hc 
stated "I moved out here [California] when Mrs. Rozan came 
out here to give birth to our son" ; that he had voted in Cali-
fornia "By absentee ballot at the last presidential election 
[1952]" and had considered this his residence since 1948. 
The foregoing evidence amply supports the trial court's find-
ing of domicile not later than July, 1948. 
[4] The next essential finding on which the division of 
property depends is "that after plaintiff and defendant be~ 
came domiciled in California, as a result of defendant's work, 
efforts, ability, and skills as an oil broker and operator, they 
acquired some money and property but that in the latter 
part of 1948 and in any event before May 1949 they lost 
everything so acquired by them from the latter part of 1948 
until May 1949 and had none thereof and that sometime 
between December 1948 and May 1949, Rozan was obliged to 
apply to the Veterans' Administration for a pension in order 
to furnish plaintiff and Rozan their necessary living expenses 
and necessities of life." This finding is substantiated by the 
testimony of plaintiff as well as that of defendant, who stated 
"At that time I was hard pressed. I had properties but no 
income." 
[5] The last finding on which the division of property 
depends is that the North Dakota properties "were acquired 
with community property and community property money." 
It is undisputed that these properties were acquired after 
1949, at which time plaintiff and defendant had no funds. 
Defendant's testimony supports the finding that these proper-
ties were purchased with movables, for he testified that he 
made a lot of money on his Canadian ventures as an oil opera-
tor and that it was with this money that the North Dakota 
properties were purchased. Both plaintiff's and defendant's 
testimony supports the finding that at the time of trial they 
still owned everything that they owned when they left Colo-
rado in May of 1948, except two parcels that defendant trans-
ferred to a trust for his son and an interest that plaintiff 
sold. Plaintiff accounted for the expenditure of the proceeds 
received from the sale of that interest. [6] It thus appears 
that the purchase :qloney for the North Dakota properties 
was acquired by J;.be efforts and skill of defendant as an oil 
operator subsequent to the establishment of the California 
domicile and was therefore community property. (Schecter 
T. Superior Oourt, supra, ante, pp. 3, 10-11.) [7] More-
) 
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over there is a presumption that in the absence of evidence of 
gift, bequest, devise or descent, all property acquired by the 
husband after marriage is community property. (Civ. Code, 
§§ 163, 164; Estate of Duncan, 9 Cal.2d 207, 217 [70 P.2d 
174] ; Estate of Jolly, 196 Cal. 547, 553 [238 P. 353] ; Nilson 
v. Sarment,153 Cal. 524, 527 [96 P. 315, 126 Am.St.Rep. 911 ; 
Wilson v. Wilson, 76 Cal.App.2d 119, 125-126 [172 P.2d 
568}.) [8] There is no evidence that the purchase money 
was acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent. There is, 
therefore, substantial evidence to sustain the trial court's 
finding that the North Dakota properties were purchased with 
community property funds. It follows that the trial court 
could properly declare that the plaintiff was entitled to 65 
per cent of such property as against the husband, for it is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court to assign the 
community property to the respective parties in such propor-
tions as it deems just when a divorce is granted on the ground 
of extreme cruelty (Civ. Code, § 146). 
[9] After acquiring the real property in North Dakota, 
defendant divested himself of title thereto by means of 
various conveyances, and title was eventually put in the name 
of Eugene Rosen, defendant's nephew, either individually or 
as trustee of a purported trust for the minor child. The 
defendant contends that the trial court erred in holding that 
these were not actual transactions, but were without considera-
tion and fraudulent as to the plaintiff. The trial court found 
that the purported transfers took place on or about the dates 
of recordation and not on the dates in the deeds. This finding 
is supported by the evidence that many of the dates on the 
notarized deeds were dates that other evidence showed could 
not possibly be the dates on which the deeds were notarized. 
Thus, there was evidence that defendant was not even in 
North Dakota when some of the purported notarized dating 
took place. Most of the notarizing was done by the same 
notary, McCormick's secretary. McCormick was a party to 
certain of the North Dakota transactions that the court de-
clared were fraudulent. Although McCormick was a code-
fendant in this action, he did not appeal. 
[10] Other evidence also indicates that these transactions 
were not bona fide. In the Kvam transaction defendant pur-
ported to trade the Kvam property and the "five Wanberg 
acres" to McCorlJ1ick in exchange for the Tripp County 
lease. The deal was purportedly closed at a time when Mc-
Cormick did not own the Tripp County lease that he was 
Nov. 19571 RouN '11. ROZAN 
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giving in trade. At the same time, or within a day or two, 
the K vam property was transferred to Eugene Rosen, nephew 
of the defendant, and McCormick accepted as payment 
Rosen's unsecured note for some $49,000. He admitted that 
he knew nothing about Rosen's financial status and stated 
that Rosen had as much as told him that •• he didn't have any 
money. " McCormick had never made a title search on the 
Kvam property, and defendant had never made a title search 
on the Tripp County land, which was claimed to be worth 
$53,500. The testimony of defendant and McCormick with 
respect to these transactions was vague and evasive and dif· 
fered as to how and where the transactions were carried out. 
It further appears that McCormick accepted the Rud lease, 
owned by defendant, in payment for Rosen's $49,000 note, 
although the value of the Rud lease did not exceed $880. 
Much of the land was transferred to Eugene Rosen as trustee 
of a purported trust for the minor child, and admittedly there 
was no consideration therefor. All of these transff:!rs were 
without the consent of the plaintiff. 
It is significant that since plaintiff began this action, de-
fendant divested himself of title to all but one parcel of his 
land in North Dakota, some 18 parcels, and that each parcel 
was placed in the name of his nephew, Eugene Rosen, either 
individually or as a purported trustee. In his deposition taken 
at Silver Springs, Maryland, except for giving his name and 
address and identifying certain documents, Eugene Rosen 
refused to answer all questions on the ground that his answers 
might tend to incriminate him. The only property that de-
fendant purportedly owns is the Tripp County lease, which 
the court found was transferred from McCormick to defendant 
to simulate consideration for the apparently valuable Kvam 
property and the five Wanberg acres. Both of these latter 
parcels were transferred the same day or within a day or 
two to Eugene Rosen. It is also significant that although de-
fendant claims that some of the property transferred to his 
nephew individually was for a consideration, he cannot ac· 
count for the consideration. Thus, there is abundant evi-
dence to support the trial court's finding that these trans-
actions were fraudulent as to plaintiff. 
As to the $2,500 note of M. W. Truss that defendant pur· 
portedly sold to MC,Cormick, substantial evidence supports 
the trial court's finding that it was only a "wash" trans· 
action for the purpose of depriving plaintiff of her interest 
in the note and the proceeds thereof and that the proceeds 
) 
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collected by the receiver in this suit are community property. 
Furthermore, such a finding, even if erroneous, was detri-
mental to McCormick and not to defendant, and McCormick 
has not appealed. 
Defendant contends finally that the judgment directly af· 
fects the title to land in another state and therefore exceeded 
the court's jurisdiction. [11] A court of one state cannot 
directly affect or determine the title to land in another. (Fall 
v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11 [30 s.Ot. 3, 54 L.Ed. 65, 23 L.R.A. 
N.S. 924] ; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87, lQ6 [11 S.Ct. 
960,35 L.Ed. 640] ; Taylor v. Taylor, 192 Cal.7i, 76 [218 P. 
756, 51 A.L.R. 1074J j Melvin v. Oarl, 118 Cal.App. 249, 251 
[4 P.2d 954] ; Redwood lnv. Co. v. Ezley, 64 Cal.App. 455, 458 
[221 P. 973] j Launer v. Griffen, 60 Cal.App.2d 659, 662 
[141 P.2d 236].) [12] It is well settled, however, that a 
court, with the parties before it, can compel the execution 
of a conveyance in the form required by the law of the situs 
and that such a conveyance will be recognized there. (Muller 
v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444, 449-450 [24 L.Ed. 207]; Watkins v. 
Holman, 16 Pet. (U.S.) 25,57 [10 L.Ed. 873] ; Oorbett v. Nutt, 
10 Wall (U.S.) 464, 475 [19 L.Ed. 976]; Massie v. Watts, 
6 Cranch. (U.S.) 148, 160- [3 L.Ed. 181] j Oole v. Manning, 
79 Cal.App. 55, 63 [248 P. 1065] j Tully v. Bailey, 46 Cal.App. 
2d 195, 200 [115 P.2d 542) j Deschenes v. Tallman,248 N.Y. 33 
[161 N.E. 321, 322]; see Rest., Conflict of Laws, § 97, com-
ment aj Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land 
Decrees, 21 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 620, 628-629.) If the court 
has entered a decree of specific performance, but the con-
veyance has not been executed, the majority of states, bl-
cluding California, will give effect to the decree. (Spalding 
v. Spalding, 75 Cal.App. 569, 580 [243 P. 445] j Redwood Inv. 
Co. v. EzZey, 64 Cal.App. 455, 458 [221 P. 973] j Idaho Gold 
Min. Co. v. Winchell, (Idaho) 59 P. 533, 535 [96 Am.St.Rep. 
290] ; Matson v. Matson, 186 Iowa 607, 622 [173 N.W. 127] ; 
Meents v. Oomstock, 230 Iowa 63, 69 [296 N.W. 721] ; Dunlap 
v. Byers, 110 Mich. 109, 117 [67 N.W. 1067]; Deschenes v. 
Tallman, 248 N.Y. 33 [161 M.E. 321, 322] ; RobUn v. Long, 
60 How.Pr. (N.Y.) 200, 205; Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio 
St. 474, 479-480 [15 Am.Rep. 621] j Mallette v. Scheerer, 164 
Wis. 415, 419 [160 N.W. 182]; see Stumberg, Conflict of 
Laws [2d ed.] p. 125.) Thus in Redwood Inv. 00. v. E:z;ley, 
64 Cal.App. 455, 499 [221 P. 973], the court stated with refer-
ence to a Kentuc'ky decree of specific performance to land in 
California: 'c It may be pleaded as a basis or cause of action 
) 
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or defense in the courts of the state where the land is situated. 
and is entitled in such a court to the force and effect of record 
evidence of the equities therein determined unless it be im. 
peached for fraud. " [13] There is no sound reason for deny· 
ing a decree of a court of equity the same full faith and credit 
accorded any other kind of judgment. .. Without exception. 
the courts recognize the validity of a deed executed under 
the compulsion of a foreign decree. But if the decree did 
not deal rightfully and constitutionally with the title to the 
land it would be voidable" for duress. Recognition of the deed 
necessarily involves acceptance of the decree. Whatever in· 
trusion on the state's exclusive control is implied in the recog· 
nition of the decree is accomplished through the recognition 
of the deed. A policy so easily evaded, so dependent on the 
success of the defendant in eluding the enforcement process 
of the foreign court, is a formal, lifeless thing, and the truth 
must be that foreign judicial proceedings of this type pose no 
real threat to the legitimate interest of the situs state." 
(Currie, supra, 21 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 620, 628.629.) Thus in 
the majority of states, such decrees are given dect as a res 
judicata declaration of the rights and equities of the parties. 
(Cases supra; Mills v. Mills, 147 Cal.App.2d· 107, 116-119 
[305 P.2d 61] ; Hicks v. Corbett, 130 Cal.App.2d 87, 90 [278 
P.2d 77] ; Dodd v. Bell, 180 Ga. 313 [178 S.E. 663, 664] ; Dob· 
son v. P6OII'ce, 12 N.Y. 156, 166 [62 Am.Dec. 152] ; Baughan 
v. Goodwin, (Tex.Civ.App.) 162 S.W.2d 732, 736; Hall v. 
Jones, (Tex.Civ.App.) 54 S.W.2d 835, 836; see Barbour, The 
Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree, 17 Mich.L. 
Rev. 527, 532; Currie, supra, 21 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 620, 629, 678-
679; Lorenzen, Application of Full Faith and Credit Clause to 
Equitable Decrees for the Conveyance of Foreign Land, 34 
Yale L.J. 591, 612.) Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 [30 S.Ct. 3, 54 
L.Ed. 65, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 924], on which defendant relies did 
not hold otherwise. "In that case the Washington decree 
directly affected title to land in Nebraska. A commissioner of 
the Washington court had executed a deed to that land and 
Mrs. Fall attempted to use this deed as a muniment of title 
in her action to quiet title against a grantee of the husband. 
[14] In the light of the foregoing principles the judgment 
in the present case is res judicata and entitled to full faith 
and credit in North,"Dakota to the extent that it determines 
the rights and equtties of the parties with respect to the land 
in question. An action on that judgment in North Dakota. 
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land there. Thus, the judgment must be affirmed to the ex-
tent that it declares the rights of the parties before the court 
and modified to the extent that it purports to afl'ect the title 
to the land. 
[15] Neither Eugene Rosen, who holds record title, nor 
the minor child, who is the beneficiary of the purported trust, 
were parties to this action and the judgment is therefore not 
binding on them. Defendant and McCormick are bound, 
however, for they were parties to the action and appeared 
therein. . 
In several respects the judgment purportS to afl'ect title to 
the land and must therefore be modified. Thus, paragraph 11 
declares that the Rollins' deed purporting to convey the K vam 
property to McCormick is a nullity, that McCormick never 
acquired title, and that therefore Rosen never acquired title. 
Accordingly, the judgment is modified by striking paragraph 
11 therefrom. 
Paragraph 21 of the judgment awards 65 per cent of the 
North Dakota properties and the past, present, and future 
rents, issues and profits therefrom to plaintiff as her sole and 
separate property and awards 35 per cent thereof to Rozan 
subject to a lien for alimony, child support, and attorney'. 
fees. This paragraph purports to act directly on the property, 
and is therefore modified to read as follows: "21. IT Is 
FURTHER ORDERED A.ND ADJUDGED, that each and everyone 
of the aforementioned North Dakota properties mentioned and 
more specifically described in finding of fact No. 18 and each 
of the subparagraphs thereof, and the Kvam property, were 
acquired with community property funds of plaintUI and 
Rozan j that said properties were transferred to defeat plain-
tiff's rights as described in paragraph 18; that plaintUf is 
entitled to 65% of the aforementioned properties and of the 
rents, issues and profits thereof as against Rozan j that Rozan 
is entitled to 35% of the aforementioned properties and of i. 
the rents, issues and profits thereof as againsfplaintitf j and," 
Paragraph 31 (C1. Tr. p. 92, lines 22-29) purports to declare 
a lien on Rozan's interest in the North Dakota land and is 
therefore modified to read as follows: "31. IT Is FURTHER 
ORDERED A.ND ADJUDGED, that plaintitf have, and is hereby 
given a lien for aforementioned alimony, child support and 
attorney's fees upon any and all separate property that Rozan 
now has in the Sta~· of California." 
Paragraphs 7 ana 18 of the judgment purport to act directly 
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and still are the community property of plaintiff and Rozan;". 
The judgment is therefore modified by striking in paragraph 
7 the words "became, were and still are the community prop-
erty of plaintiff and Rozan" (01. Tr. p. 84, lines 27-28) and 
by striking in paragraph 18 the words "at all times herein 
mentioned were and still are the community property of 
plaintiff and Rozan" (01. Tr. p: 89, lines 6-7) and inserting 
in lieu thereof in each instance the words "were acquired 
with community property funds of plaintiff and ·Rozan." 
'l'he judgment is affirmed as modified. Defendant shall 
bear the costs on appeal. 
Gibson, O. J., Shenk, J., Oarter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McOomb, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
4, 1957. 
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